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Conventional  game-theoretic  solution  concepts  never  guarantee  meaningful  com- 
munication  in  cheap-talk  games. I  define  a solution  concept  which  does guarantee 
communication  in  some  games. I  assume  full  rationality  without  imposing  equi- 
librium  conditions,  but  add  a natural  behavioral  assumption  about  how  agents use 
language:  agents  have  a propensity  to  speak  the  truth  and  to  believe  others  speak 
the  truth,  but  use  the  game’s  strategic  incentives  to  check  whether  such  behavior 
and  beliefs  are  rational.  I  also  define  and  prove  the  existence  of an  equilibrium 
version  of  the  concept,  and  present  examples  where  its  predictions  seem  more 
natural  than  Farrell’s  neologism-proof  equilibrium.  Journal  of  Economic  Literature 
Classification  Number:  026.  r‘  1990  Academic  PW,  IX 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Economists  have  become  used  to  the  idea  that  agents  can  take  costly 
actions  to  signal  private  information.  For  instance,  Spence  [lo]  shows that 
workers  may  undertake  costly  education  to  signal  their  productivity  to 
potential  employers,  even  if  the  education  has  no  effect  on  workers’ 
productivity.  If  the  costs  of  education  vary  with  a  worker’s  type,  his 
willingness  to  incur  these  costs  may  signal  his  type. 
More  recently,  game  theorists  have  begun  to  formalize  the  role  of verbal 
and  similar  low-cost  communication  in  strategic  settings.  In  many  contexts, 
the  potential  for  low-cost  communication  is  unimportant.  For  instance,  in 
Spence’s  example,  employers  will  not  believe  unverifiable  claims  by  a 
worker  that  he  is  productive;  if  they  did,  every  worker  would  claim  to  be 
very  productive.  This  captures  the  intuition  that  talk  is  cheap:  if  making 
claims  is  effortless,  an  agent  is  likely  to  make  a  self-serving  claim,  not 
necessarily  a truthful  one. 
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In  situations  of pure  coordination,  on  the  other  hand,  such  “cheap  talk” 
can  be  very  credible.  If  two  agents  agree  about  what  action  is  optimal 
contingent  on  any  information,  each  is  likely  to  believe  informational 
claims  by  the  other.  More  generally,  most  strategic  situations  involve  neither 
pure  coordination  nor  pure  conflict,  so  that  the  extent  of  meaningful 
communication  is  less  obvious.  In  this  paper,  I  formulate  a  theory  that 
begins  to  explore  the  extent  and  nature  of  meaningful  communication  in 
strategic  situations. 
Using  standard  equilibrium  analysis,  Crawford  and  Sobel  [S]  first 
demonstrated  formally  that  adding  cheap  talk  to  strategic  situations  can 
expand  the  set of possible  outcomes.  An  informed  agent  might  convincingly 
reveal  some  of his  information  so as to  induce  an  uninformed  agent  to  take 
particular  actions.  Most  strikingly,  even  if  two  agents  never  fully  agree 
about  which  strategic  action  would  be  best,  cheap  talk  still  can  achieve 
some  degree  of coordination. 
Unfortunately,  standard  game  theory  can  neuer  guarantee  meaningful 
communication,  even  in  games  of  pure  coordination.  When  any  conven- 
tional  solution  concept  is  used  to  analyze  cheap  talk,  there  always  exist 
babbling  equilibria,  in  which  no  communication  0ccurs.l  In  such  equilibria, 
no  messages  are  interpreted  by  the  uninformed  agent  as being  meaningful, 
so  that  the  informed  agent  might  as well  randomize  over  which  messages 
he  sends.  If  he  does  so,  then  the  uninformed  agent  is  justified  in  not 
believing  statements,  and  he will  consequently  maintain  his  prior  beliefs  no 
matter  what  statement  he  hears.  Most  strikingly,  even  when  agents  fully 
agree  on  which  actions  are  appropriate  given  the  private  information,  there 
is  no  guarantee  that  such  private  information  gets  communicated. 
Farrell  [S]  argues  that  the  existence  of a rich,  common  language  among 
agents  should  be  given  a  stronger  role  in  game  theory,  so  that  meaningful 
communication  can  be predicted  confidently  in  some  situations.  A  common 
language  consists  of  (1)  a  meaningful  vocabulary,  and  (2)  a  common 
understanding  among  agents  that  it  is  appropriate  to  interpret  statements 
according  to  their  literal  meaning.  Of  course,  rational  uninformed  agents 
will  not  naively  believe  all  things  that  an  informed  agent  says if their  inter- 
ests diverge.  But  it  is natural  to  assume  that  such  agents  have  a propensity 
to  believe  statements  if  such  belief  is  consistent  with  rationality.  As  Farrell 
’ By “conventional  solution  concepts,”  I  mean  any non-cooperative  solution  concept  which 
attempts  to  restrict  outcomes  based  on  some  form  of internal  consistency or  on  some  notion 
of strategic  stability.  This  includes  Nash  equilibrium  and  its many refinements  from  Kreps  and 
Wilson’s  [6]  sequential  equilibrium  (which  Crawford  and  Sobel  use)  to  Kohlberg  and 
Mertens’s  [7]  strategic  stability,  as well  as the  non-equilibrium  concept  of rationalizability 
(see  Bernheim  [l]  and  Pearce  [9]).  This  excludes,  for  instance,  Pareto  dominance  as  a 
selection  criterion  among  equilibria,  and  many cooperative  solution  concepts. 146  MATTHEW  RABIN 
says, “Although  honesty  may  not  always  be  the  best  policy,  it  is  a  focal 
policy.” 
I  develop  below-for  the  same  simple  strategic  situations  examined  by 
Crawford  and  Sobel  and  by  Farrell-a  solution  concept,  Credible  Message 
Rationalizability  (CMR),  which  combines  Farrell’s  rich  language  assump- 
tion  with  the  assumption  that  agents  are  rational.  The  solution  concept 
formalizes  the  notion  that  honesty  is  a  focal  policy,  and  then  provides  a 
test  of  when  such  honesty  is  a  reasonable  policy  for  both  of  the  agents. 
Formally,  I  show that  the  theory  is  consistent  with  rationality  by  proving 
that  any  permitted  behavior  by  either  player  is  optimal  with  respect  to 
some  beliefs  over  the  permitted  behavior  of the  other  player. 
Consider  the  cheap  talk  situation  shown  in  Example  1.  Agent  S  is 
informed,  and  can  be  of  three  types,  where  his  type  represents  the  real- 
ization  of  his  private  information.  While  Agent  S  knows  his  type,  an 
uninformed  agent,  R,  does  not,  and  has  beliefs  assigning  probability  f to 
each  type.  Agent  R  can  take  any  of three  actions,  where  these actions  affect 
both  players.  The  payoffs  for  each  player  are  a  function  of  types  and 
actions  taken.  Before  R  takes  his  action,  S  can  send  a  message  in  some 
shared  language.  What  would  he  say, and  what  would  R  believe? 
Suppose  that  S  says, “I’m  t, .” To  choose  an appropriate  response,  player 
R  must  figure  out  which  types  of player  S  would  say that.  If he believed  the 
statement  were true,  he would  play  a,.  If  he did  so,  the  only  type  of player 
S  that  would  ever  want  to  make  such a statement  would  be  t,,  who  would 
get  his  optimal  payoff  from  a,.  The  other  types  would  each  get  their  worst 
outcome  possible  by  claiming  to  be  t 1. So,  ifit  is common  knowledge  that 
“I’m  t, ”  will  be  believed,  then  it  will  be  true. 
The  fact  that  the  truth  is focal  is crucial  for  inducing  useful  communica- 
tion  here.  Suppose,  alternatively,  that  R  thinks  that  S  is just  babbling,  SO 
that  there  is  no  correlation  between  what  S  says and  his  type.  Then  if he 
hears  “I’m  t ,”  (or  any  other  statement),  R  will  take  action  a3,  because  this 
yields  the  highest  expected  payoff  given  his  un-updated  prior  beliefs.  This 
would  be  “fully  rational.”  It  is consistent,  for  instance,  with  both  sequential 
EXAMPLE  1 
s  R 
t1  12  t3  1,  12  t3 
aI  10  0  0  10  0  0 
a2  0  10  10  0  10  0 
a3  0  5  5  0  1  7 COMMUNICATION  BETWEEN  AGENTS  147 
equilibrium  and  rationalizability.  But  communication  does  not  occur  only 
because  neither  player  expects  it  to  occur,  which  seems to  be unrealistic  in 
this  case. 
By  contrast  to  the  credibility  of  “I’m  t,,”  suppose  it  were  common 
knowledge  that  R  always  believed  the  statement  “I’m  t2,”  and  therefore 
always  reacted  with  his  optimal  move,  u2.  Then  both  types  t2 and  t,  would 
wish  to  make  the  statement,  since  it  yields  them  both  their  highest  possible 
payoff.  If  both  types  make  the  statement,  then  the  optimal  reaction  for  R 
would  be  to  play  a3,  not  a2.  Naive  belief  by  R  that  S  always  tells  the  truth 
would  lead  him  to  react  suboptimally  to  the  statement  “I’m  t2.”  Rationality 
would  thus  seem  to  dictate  that  R  not  necessarily  believe  this  statement. 
CMR  formally  captures  both  the  credibility  of the  statement  “I’m  t,”  and 
the  incredibility  of “I’m  tZ.” 
My  approach  contrasts  with  most  formal  game  theory  in  that  I  do  not 
attempt  predictions  based  solely  on  notions  of internal  consistency  given 
the  specifications  of the  game.  Rather,  I  explicitly  make  additional  assump- 
tions  about  behavior  and  the  beliefs  of agents  about  the  use of language. 
These  assumptions  are  not  ad  hoc.  If  agents  share  a  common  language, 
they  do  not  babble;  they  communicate.  Game  theory  which  ignores  this 
tendency  unnecessarily  loses predictive  power. 
By  incorporating  it  into  a  solution  concept,  I  take  the  view that  such  a 
tendency  for  communication  can  be  usefully  integrated  into  formal  game 
theory.  Often  analysts  recognize  that  some  outcomes  are  more  plausible 
than  others,  and,  game  by  game,  informally  select  among  the  outcomes 
that  formal  analysis  deems  possible.  Also,  more  general  solution  concepts 
like  Pareto-dominant  equilibria,  as  well  as  Nash  equilibrium  itself,  are 
sometimes  argued  to  be  the  natural  outcomes  in  communicationally  rich 
environments.  By  explicitly  formulating  a theory  of communication,  we can 
better  understand  whether  such  selection  criteria  are  indeed  natural. 
The  theory  presented  is  meant  to  be  a  non-equilibrium  notion,  in  the 
spirit  of  rationalizability  as first  formulated  by  Bernheim  [l]  and  Pearce 
[9].  Equilibrium  analysis  assumes  that,  even  when  there  are multiple  equi- 
libria,  agents  know  the  specific  (but  possibly  mixed)  strategy  employed  by 
another  agent.  Rationalizability  assumes  common  knowledge  of rationality, 
but  allows  that  players  are  perhaps  wrong  in  their  conjecture  about  which 
reasonable  strategy  another  player  might  choose.  I  assume  common 
knowledge  of both  rationality  and  a general  theory  of communication,  but 
likewise  do  not  assume  that  a player  necessarily  conjectures  correctly  about 
which  among  many  reasonable  strategies  the  other  player  will  employ. 
This  approach  constrasts  with  that  of  Farrell  [S].  Using  the  rich 
language  assumption,  he  defines  credible  neologisms  as deviations  from  a 
given  sequential  equilibrium.  From  this,  he  defines  a  solution  concept, 
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equilibria  for  which  there  are no  credible  neologisms.  In  addition  to  NPE’s 
being  an  equilibrium  concept,  there  are  several  other  differences  between 
CMR  and  NPE.  In  Section  III,  I  present  some  examples  comparing  the 
two  approaches.2  To  further  compare  them,  I  also  define  an  equilibrium 
version  of  my  theory:  Credible  Message  Equilibrium  (CME).  It  eliminates 
certain  sequential  equilibria  by  using  rich  language  as  an  ex  ante 
behavioral  assumption,  instead  of as a  means  of judging  the  credibility  of 
deviations  from  an  equilibrium. 
One  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  use  a  formal  model  to  investigate  how 
communication  aids  coordination.  Indeed,  one  of  the  frequent  informal 
arguments  for  why  an  equilibrium  is likely  to  obtain  in  strategic  settings  is 
based  on  cheap  talk.  It  is  argued  that  if  agents  can  cheaply  communicate 
and  verbally  agree  to  strategies,  then  only  Nash  equilibria  will  be  self- 
enforcing  agreements.  As  with  Farrell  [4],  this  paper  can  help  us  better 
understand  the  issue  of how and  whether  communication  helps  equilibrate 
strategic  behavior.  As  with  Farrell,  I  find  only  limited  support  for  the 
hypothesis  that  communication  necessarily  yields  equilibrium  behavior. 
CMR  puts  forth  a  particular  theory  of  language,  but  other  theories 
consistent  with  rationality  can  be  formulated.  Indeed,  CMR  seems  to 
be  a  weak  theory:  I  feel  that  all  the  predicted  communication  is  quite 
reasonable,  but  even  further  communication  is  likely  in  many  settings. 
I  briefly  discuss the  possibility  of stronger  theories  of communication  in  the 
concluding  section.  I  also  briefly  discuss  the  extension  of CMR  or  related 
concepts  to  richer,  more  interesting  strategic  settings. 
II.  CREDIBLE  MESSAGE  RATIONALIZABILITY 
Consider  a  Simple  Communication  Game.  The  information  of  an 
informed  agent,  player  S,  can  be  characterized  by  a  finite  set  of  types, 
T=  {t,,  t,,  .  .  .  . tN).  Player  S  is  assumed  to  know  his  type;  an  uninformed 
agent,  player  R,  has prior  beliefs  represented  by  the  probability  distribution 
p  over  T.  Player  S  sends  a  message  from  a  finite  set  of  messages, 
M=  {m,,  m2,  .  .  .  . mL>.  The  number  of messages,  L,  is  assumed  to  be large, 
greater  than  2 N + ‘.  After  S  sends a message,  player  R  takes  an  action  from 
a  finite  set  of  actions,  A.  Both  players’  utility  functions,  US(a,  t)  and 
UR(a,  t),  depend  only  on  the  private  information  known  by  S  and  the 
action  taken  by  R,  and  thus  do  not  depend  directly  on  the  message  sent. 
’  Myerson  [S]  also  uses  the  rich  language  assumption.  His  approach  is  very  similar  to  that 
of  Farrell:  he  rules  out  equilibria  based  on  the  credibility  of  deviating  neologisms.  While  his 
solution  concept  does  not  suffer  from  non-existence,  Myerson  can  only  guarantee  existence  by 
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Player  S’s  strategy  set,  C,,  consists  of all  possible  mappings  from  T to 
M;  that  is, he sends a message  as a function  of his  private  information.  This 
function  can  be  probabilistic,  so that  C,  includes  mixed  strategies.  Player 
R’s  strategy  set, .E,,  consists  of mappings  from  M  to  A;  he  takes  an  action 
as a  function  of the  message  he  receives.  Player  R  too  can  employ  mixed 
strategies. 
I  will  say that  a strategy  y by  R maps  the  message  m into  a set of actions 
A”  E  A  if  it  assigns  probability  1 that  some  action  a E A” will  be  employed 
when  the  message  m is sent.  I  will  define  o(t)  to  be the  probability  distribu- 
tion  of messages  sent  by  type  t  if  S  employs  strategy  r~. The  function  y(m) 
similarly  defines  the  probability  distribution  over  A  in  response  to  the 
message  m if  R uses strategy  y. Let  V’(o,  y),  VR(o,  y)  denote  the  expected 
utilities  of  S  and  R  respectively  when  S  uses  (possibly  mixed)  strategy  0 
and  R  employs  (possible  mixed)  strategy  y. These  utilities  for  both  types 
are  taken  in  terms  of  expected  value  over  the  different  types  of player  S. 
A  strategy  LJ  strongly  dominates 0’  with  respect to  a set Zi  of  strategies 
for  player  R  if  for  all  probability  distributions  7~ defined  over  Cg, 
C,  n(y)  V’(cr,  y) >  C,  z(y)  V’(CJ’,  y).  Strong  dominance  is  defined  likewise 
for  player  R. 
With  each  subset  of  types  Xs  T,  associate  an  exclusive  set of messages 
M(X)  from  M:  For  all  Xi  #  Xj,  M(X,)  n  M(X,)  =  0.  The  existence  of such 
messages  for  all  sets  of  types  captures  the  idea  that  a  meaningful 
vocabulary  exists.  Such  messages  are  meant  to  come  from  a  common 
language  pre-dating  the  specific  strategic  situation,  but  with  which  the 
agents  can  richly  describe  all  relevant  strategic  issues. 
A  message  m E M(X)  is meant  to  convey  the  information  “I’m  some  type 
in  set X.“3  Most  likely,  the  agents  will  use more  natural  language,  such  as 
“I  like  fish”  or  “Money  is  not  important  to  me.”  In  the  setting  examined, 
player  S  is  trying  to  induce  an  action  by  R. Thus,  statements  suggesting 
actions  rather  than  direct  assertions  about  the  private  information,  such  as 
“You  should  invest  in  my  company”  or  “It  will  pay  you  to  hire  me”  are 
also  natural.  Given  the  setting  and  the  incentives,  any  claim  about  informa- 
tion  implicitly  proposes  one  or  more  courses  of action,  and  implicit  in  any 
proposal  for  action  is  an  understanding  of which  types  would  prefer  that 
action. 
What  matters  is that  the  agents’  understanding  of the  vocabulary  and  the 
strategic  situation  is clear  enough  that  any  preference  over  actions  can  be 
unambiguously  conveyed.  (Of  course,  I  allow  that  the  informed  agent  may 
3 If M(X)  were  a singleton  for  each  X, then  there  would  be only one way to  convey the  idea, 
“I’m  some  type  in  set X.”  The  main  intuition  for  all  of the  results  would  be  captured  if each 
M(X)  were  a singleton.  The  fact that  I  assume  that  there  may be  many ways to  express  this 
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choose  not  to  communicate:  he  can  speak  gibberish  or  can  remain  silent.) 
It  does  not  matter  for  our  purposes  exactly  what  language,  speaking  style, 
or  low-cost  mode  of  communication  (e.g.,  verbal  or  written)  is  being 
employed.  In  fact,  because  most  of the  analysis  investigates  the  incentives 
for  truth-telling,  the  actual  message  space  is  largely  suppressed.  I  focus 
primarily  on  which  types  of S  will  induce  which  physical  actions,  not  the 
actual  words  used  in  achieving  this. 
A  type  profile  is  a  list  of exclusive,  not  necessarily  exhaustive,  subsets  of 
types  of agent  S,  3=  {X,,Xz,  .  .  ..X.).  Let  TX=  {t13Xi~X:t~Xij.  T,  is 
the  set  of  types  that  are  in  some  subset  that  is  an  element  of  the  type 
profile.  Let  M(X)  =  lJX,,g  M(X,).  M(.%)  is  simply  the  set of self-signaling 
claims  by  the  subsets  of X. 
Definitions  1 through  6 construct  a type  profile  that  my  theory  predicts 
can  send  a  credible  message  profile.  I  will  motivate  the  definitions 
intuitively  as developing  a  set of messages  that  should  always  be  believed 
by  R  (and  a  set of types  that  should  always  send  those  messages).  Yet,  to 
be  a theory  of communication,  I  must  fully  specify  what  messages all  types 
of  S  will  send,  and  how  R  interprets  every  message  in  ni.  Definition  7 
explicitly  formulates  a  theory  of permissible  strategies  for  each  player  into 
which  this  notion  of  credible  messages  can  be  embedded.  Proposition  1 
shows that  this  theory  is consistent  with  rationality,  formally  capturing  the 
intuition  of the  earlier  definitions. 
DEFINITION  1.  Let  A*=  {a*~A(3n(T),  O,<n(t)Vt,  and  C,,rn(t)>O, 
such  that  a*~  {argmax,,,  xtern(t)  UR(a,  t)}}. 
The  function  n(t)  represents  the  beliefs  that  R  can  hold  about  which 
types  he  is facing  (it  is  not  normalized  to  add  up  to  1 over  the  entire  set 
of types). 
A*  is  the  set of actions  for  which  there  are  some  beliefs  by  R  about  who 
sent  a message  for  which  the  action  is an  optimal  response.  Player  S  could 
never  hope  to  induce  an  action  outside  this  get,  so that  any  type  of S  will 
always  be  fully  satisfied  if he  can  induce  his  best  action  within  this  set. 
DEFINITION  2.  Let  A*(X,)=  (a*(a*Eargmax,.,  C,,x,p(t)  UR(u,  t)]. 
A*(X,)  is  the  set  of  optimal  actions  by  R  if he  thought  he  was facing 
exactly  the  types  in  X,.  (Recall  that  p(t)  are  the  prior  beliefs  that  R  ascribes 
to  type  t.)  This  has  clear  applications  for  a  theory  of credible  messages:  if 
R  believed  a message  by  S  claiming  to  be any  type  in  Xi  were always  made 
by  types  in  X,  and  never  made  by  other  types,  then  any  action  in  A*(X,) 
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DEFINITION  3.  Let  Y(X)  =  T\T,. 
Y(X)  is  the  set  of types  that  are  not  in  the  type  profile  X. 
DEFINITION  4.  Let  Y*(xj,  X)  be the  set of types  in  Y(X),  excluding  any 
type  t  with  the  property  that  either: 
(1)  A*(X,)  =  (u*  1  c1* E argmin,,  A. US(a,  t)},  or 
(2)  3X,EX:Us(a*,  t)<  US@,  t)  vu*EA*(X,),  vaEA*(Xk). 
Y*(X,,  X)  represents  all  the  types  of  player  S  that  would  conceivably 
want  to  imitate  the  message  sent  by  the  types  Xi,  if  player  R  were  to 
believe  a  self-signaling  message  by  X1.  Types  excluded  from  this  set  either 
(1)  would  always  do  their  worst  possible  by  imitating  the  set  X,,  or 
(2)  could  do  better  by  imitating  some  other  set in  X. 
DEFINITION  5.  Let  A**(Xj,  X)  be  the  set  of  actions  a*  such  that 
3rc(  t):  T=  [0,  l]  satisfying 
(1)  n(t)=p(t)  VtEXj, 
t2)  n(z) E Co,  P(f)1  Vf E y*(xj*  x)v 
(3)  n(r)  =  0 else, 
such  that  a*  ~argmax,...  Clerrr(t)  UR(a,  t). 
The  set A**(X,,  X)  is  the  set of optimal  actions  that  R could  take,  if he 
were sure  he  was facing  all  types  in  X,,  and  were not  sure  which  types  he 
was facing  in  Y*(x,,  X),  and  were  sure  he was not  facing  any  of the  other 
types.  (As earlier,  n(t)  represents  probabilistic  beliefs  by  R, not  normalized 
to  total  to  1.) 
Using  the  above  definitions,  I  can  propose  a set of messages  that  should 
be  considered  credible. 
DEFINITION  6.  X  is  a  Credible Message Profiile if,  VX, E X, 
(I)  VteXj,  ,4*(X,)=  {argmax,,,.  US(a,  t)},  and 
(2)  A*(Xj)  =A**(Xj’  X). 
Intuitively,  a message  profile  is considered  credible  if (1)  when  R believes 
the  literal  meanings  of  statements,  the  types  sending  the  messages  obtain 
their  best  possible  outcomes,  so  those  types  will  send  their  messages,  and 
(2)  the  statements  end  up  being  true  “enough.”  The  “enough”  comes  from 
the  fact  that  some  types  might  also  lie  to  R by  pooling  with  others’  credible 
messages,  and  R  knows  this,  but  the  probability  of  this  is  small  enough 
that  it  does  not  affect  R’s  optimal  response. 
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message  profile  were  plugged  into  a  Message  Profile  Theory  (MPT)  as 
defined  below,  then  the  resulting  theory  would  be  consistent  with  the 
rationality  of  players.  An  MPT  describes  one  possible  form  of  how  the 
agents  might  use their  common  language. 
DEFINITION  7.  Fix  a type  profile  2”. The  Message Profile  Theory  (MPT) 
with  respect  to  3,  denoted  MPT(!X),  is  the  set  of  strategy  pairs 
((0,  y):  ((T, y) E (Cc,  Cz)},  where  (ZF,  2%)  is constructed  as follows. 
Let  C,(O)  =  {y E Zc,lt’Xi~  X,  Vm E M(X,),  y  maps  m into  A*(X,),  and 
Vm E M,  y maps  m into  A * 1. Let  Z,(O)  =  (G E Z;,  1  VX, E 37, Vt E Xi,  g maps 
t  into  M(Xi),  and  Vt 4 X,u  Y*(X,,  X),  CJ  maps  t  into  M\M(X,)). 
Then  for  all  n,  let  C,(n  +  1) =  (c  gZs(n)  1  CJ is  not  strongly  dominated 
with  respect  to  C,(n)  by  any  6’ E ZJn)j,  and  Z,(n  +  1) =  {y E C,(n)  / y is 
not  strongly  dominated  with  respect  to  Z,(n)  by  any  y’ EC,,J~)}.  Choose 
N  so  that  Z,(N+  1) =  C,(N)  and  CR(N+  1) =  ZR(iV).  Then  (Zd,  ,?Z’z)  = 
(~.s(N,  ~Rw)).4 
Intuitively,  an  MPT  is a theory  permitting  any  strategies  consistent  with 
there  being  common  knowledge  that  R  will  believe  the  literal  meaning  of 
some  set  of statements  and  that  certain  types  of S  will  always  make  those 
statements.  Note  that  very  few restrictions  are  placed  on  Player  R’s  beliefs 
for  messages  not  in  any  M(X,).  The  iterated  strong  dominance  does, 
however,  guarantee  that  each  player  employs  minimally  rational  strategies 
when  sending  or  receiving  messages  outside  the  specified  message  profile. 
Thus,  iterated  strong  dominance  guarantees  that  the  players  behave 
rationally  given  that  these  statements  will  be  believed.  Yet,  for  arbitrary 
type  profiles,  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  it  is  rational  for  Player  R  to 
believe  these  statements  in  the  first  place.  In  Example  1, for  instance,  R’s 
believing  everything  that  S  says would  not  be  a reasonable  theory. 
Proposition  1 establishes  that,  when  the  type  profile  used  in  the  MPT 
can  send  a  credible  message  profile  according  to  Definition  6,  then  the 
resulting  theory  is  consistent  with  rationality. 
PROPOSITION  1.  If  %  is a  credible  message  profile,  then  MPT(X)  = 
(Cf,  C:)  satisfies: Vu EC:,  a  is not strongly  dominated with respect to .Zc 
by  any  a’ EC,.  Likewise, Vy EC:,  y  is not strongly  dominated with  respect 
to CF  by  any  Y’E.Z’~. 
Proof:  In  Appendix. 
The  proof  of this  proposition  follows  our  intuition  for  what  a reasonable 
theory  of credible  messages  should  be.  First,  as argued  above,  the  iterated 
4 Observe  that  since  the  sets of pure  strategies  are  finite,  MPT(Z)  is well-defined  for all r’, 
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strong  dominance  in  the  definition  of an  MPT  guarantees  that  given that 
it  is common  knowledge  that  a certain  list  of messages  would  be  believed, 
both  players  behave  reasonably. 
It  is essential,  however,  that  sending  and  believing  the  credible  messages 
be  consistent  with  rationality.  This  means  first  that  if  R  will  believe  the 
credible  messages,  then  it  is  optimal  for  the  cesignated  types  of S  to  send 
them.  This  is  easy  to  show,  as  such  types  get  their  maximum  possible 
payoff  from  sending  the  messages. 
More  delicate  is  whether  it  is  optimal  for  R  to  believe  all  credible 
messages.  If  there  were just  one  way  of  conveying  each  literal  meaning, 
then  R would  do  best by  believing  the  statements.  However,  since  there  are 
multiple  ways  of saying  the  same  thing,  R  might  think  he  knows  which 
type  of S  says a statement  which  way. If he can  differentiate  the  types  fully, 
then  he  might  be  able  to  take  type-specific  actions  not  available  to  him 
when  some  types  are  indistinguishable  from  each  other. 
While  this  may  not  violate  rationality  per  se,  R  is  likely  to  doubt  he 
knows  which  type  says a statement  which  way.  Since  all  types  of S  sending 
a  credible  message  together  at  least  weakly  (and  sometimes  strictly)  prefer 
to  pool  together,  they  never  have  an  incentive  to  differentiate  themselves.’ 
The  proof  shows that  this  intuition  holds.  The  theory  does  not  dictate  that 
all  t E X,  really  use identical  wording,  but  only  that  R does  not  know  their 
exact  behavior. 
Thus  far,  I  have  shown  only  that  if  it  were  common  knowledge  that  a 
particular  credible  message  profile  were to  be believed,  it  would  be sensible 
both  for  player  S  to  send  these  messages  and  for  player  R to  believe  these 
messages.  As  a  “non-equilibrium”  concept,  however,  it  is  important  that 
the  theory’s  predictions  are  natural  when  the  agents  enter  the  situation 
knowing  just  the  game  and  the  general  theory  of communication,  without 
assuming  that  they  coordinate  on  which  among  many  reasonable  strategies 
they  each  play. 
It  is desirable,  then,  that  exactly  which profile  of types  X  send  a credible 
message  profile  be common  knowledge  from  the  theory  itself.  This  requires 
a non-arbitrary  means  of choosing  this  set, as well  as one  that  gets as much 
of the  natural  communication  as possible.  In  particular,  the  most  attractive 
theory  would  be  that  both  players  believe  that  all  types  who  have  credible 
messages  will  send  them.  To  guarantee  that  this  is  a  coherent  theory,  it  is 
essential  that  if  profiles  of  types  separately  can  send  credible  message 
profiles,  then  they  can  send  a joint  one.  The  following  lemma  establishes 
that  this  is  the  case. 
LEMMA  1.  Suppose the  type  profiles  X(1)  and  X(2)  each can  send a 
5 This  contrasts  with  the  attempt  to  rule  out  babbling  equilibria.  There,  agents  often  want 
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credible  message  profile.  Then  3X  which  can  send  a credible  message  profile 
such  that  T,  =  T,y,,,  v  T,(,,. 
Proof:  In  Appendix. 
The  basic  point  of  the  proof  is  relatively  simple.  Credible  message 
profiles  are  constructed  so that  no  matter  which  types  outside  TE  profile 
R  reasonably  thinks  might  send  a credible  message,  his  optimal  reaction  is 
unchanged.  If  two  credible  message  profiles  are  joined  into  a  larger  one, 
then  the  set  of types  not  included  in  the  profile  is  smaller  than  for  either 
of the  original  profiles,  so that  R  has  to  worry  even  less about  such  types 
imitating  types  in  the  profile.  If  the  possibility  of  being  lied  to  did  not 
destroy  either  of the  original  credible  message  profiles,  then  afortiori  it  will 
not  destroy  the joint  one. 
From  Lemma  1, it  is immediate  that  there  exists  some  largest  set of types 
that,  appropriately  partitioned,  can  send  a  credible  message  profile.  It  is 
possible,  however,  that  there  may  be  two  different  maximal  type  profiles 
X(  1)  and  X(2)  containing  the  same  types,  but  partitioned  differently. 
Again,  if the  theory  does  not  assume  any  unmodelled  coordination,  it  must 
designate  which  such  partition  will  send  a  credible  message  profile.  I  now 
develop  such  a partition  of the  maximal  set of types  upon  which  the  agents 
can  focus. 
DEFINITION  8.  For  any  X  with  a  credible  message  profile,  let  X(*)  be 
the  profile  of types  such  that: 
(1)  T,=  TTC*,,  and 
(2)  t/x,,  xiEx:A*(x,)=A*(X,),  3x(*)Ex(*):xiuxj~x(*). 
X(*)  contains  the  same  set  of  types  as  does  X,  but  is  partitioned  less 
finely,  in  that  any  subsets  which  induce  the  same  actions  are  concatenated. 
Lemma  2  establishes  that  this  repartitioned  set of subsets  can  also  send  a 
credible  message. 
LEMMA  2.  For  any  X  that  can  send  a credible  message  profile,  X(*)  can 
send  a  credible  message  profile. 
ProoJ:  By  definition,  Y(X(*))  =  Y(X).  Choose  X(*)  E X(*),  where 
X(*)  =  UX.,+ K X,,  for  some  set of elements  KG  X.  By  construction  of X(*), 
A*(Xi)=A*(X,)  VXi,  X,E  K.  Thus 
A*(X(*))= 
{ 
a*la*Eargmax,...  C  p(t)  UR(a,  t) 
rem*)  I 
= 
1 
a*Ia*Eargmax,...  1  C  ~(1)  UR(a,  t) 
x, e K  I E  x, 
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This  equality  holds  VX(*)EX(*),  so  that  Y*(X(*),  X(*))=  Y*(X,,  X). 
This  in  turn  implies  A**(X(*),  X(*))  =  A**(X,,  X).  Thus,  since  the  condi- 
tions  of Definition  6 hold  VX, E X,  they  hold  VX( *)  E X( *).  This  means  that 
X(  *)  can  send a credible  message  profile.  Q.E.D. 
The  proof  is similar  in  spirit  to  that  of Lemma  1: the  additional  pooling 
of  types  in  the  new  partition  can  only  decrease  worries  that  credible 
messages  will  be  ruined  by  some  types  lying,  and  imitating  types  in  the 
profile.  The  next  result  establishes  that  for  any  set  of types  that  can  send 
a credible  message  profile,  there  exists  a unique,  coarsest  partition. 
LEMMA  3.  Let  XA  and  X,  be profiles  of  types that  can send credible 
message  profiles such that  T,,  =  T,FB. 
Then XA(*)  = X,(*). 
Proof  Suppose  XA(*)#XB(*).  Then,  without  loss  of generality,  It,,  t, 
such  that  3Xi~XA(*):  t,,  t,eX,,  but  ~X,#X,EX~(*):  t,EX,,  t,eXk. 
But  t,,  t2eXi=a  {argmax  US(a, t,)}  =  (argmax  Us(a,  t,)}  aA*(X,)  = 
A*(X,),  which  contradicts  the  construction  of X,(*).  Q.E.D. 
Lemmas  1,2,  and  3 combine  to  show that  there  exists  a unique  maximal 
set of types-and  a unique  coarsest  partition  of these  types-that  can  send 
a credible  message  profile. 
DEFINITION  9.  Let  X**  be  the  partition  of  types  that  can  send  a 
credible  message  profile  such  that: 
(1)  VX:  X  can  send  a credible  message  message  profile,  TS G T,,.  . 
(2)  v/x,,  qx**,  A*(Xi)#A*(Xj). 
The  partition  of types  X  **  is used  in  the  primary  definition: 
DEFINITION  10.  The  Credible  Message  Rationalizable  Strategies  are 
(Z;,  C;)  =  MPT(X**). 
The  uniqueness  of X**  means  that  CMR  is always  well-defined,  so that 
there  always  exists  at  least  one  pair  of strategies  consistent  with  CMR. 
Let  us apply  this  theory  of credible  communication  lirst  to  Example  1. In 
the  introduction,  I  argued  that  the  statement  “I’m  t,”  should  be considered 
credible.  We  can  check  whether  it  is,  by  itself,  a  credible  message  profile. 
A*(t,)  =  a,,  clearly.  That  is,  R’s  optimal  response  to  beliefs  that  S  is  t,  is 
to  take  action  a,.  Type  t,  likes  this  response:  a, =  argmax  U”(a,  tl).  It  only 
remains  to  show  that  no  other  types  would  want  to  make  the  claim 
“I’m  t 1  .”  But  since  a,  is  the  worst  action  from  the  point  of view of either 
of the  other  types,  Y*(t,,  t,)=@.  Thus  A**([,,  t,)=A*(t,)=a,.  Thus,  t, 
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can  send  a credible  message  profile.  This  means  that  CMR  predicts  that  t, 
will  always  induce  action  a,. 
We.can  also  check  whether  t,  can  send  a  credible  message.  It  passes 
the  first  rounds  of  the  definition:  A*(t2)  =  a2 =  argmax  US(a,  f2).  But 
then,  whether  or  not  t,  sends  a  credible  message,  Y*(t*,  X)  =  { t3}.  That 
is,  type  t3  would  always  want  to  pool  in  with  tZ.  (Because 
A*(t3)  #  argmax  US(a,  t3),  r3 will  never  send  a credible  message  himself,  so 
t,  E Y(T)  for  any  X  that  can  send  a credible  message  profile.)  This  in  turn 
implies  that  A**(tz,  97) =  a3 #  A*(t2).  According  to  our  definition,  t, 
indeed  can  not  send  a credible  message. 
In  Example  1, type  t2 always  wishes to  distinguish  himself  from  type  t,, 
but  type  t3  always  wishes  to  imitate  t,.  Note  that  t,  does  not  want  R  to 
believe  he  can  be of either  type;  he specifically  wants  to  appear  as t,.  Thus, 
t,  can  never  credibly  separate  himself.  This  is  like  the  Spence  example, 
where  t2 is a productive  worker  and  t,  is an  unproductive  worker.  The  bad 
worker  would  always  do  his  utmost  to  imitate  the  productive  worker,  so 
that  there  is  no  scope  for  credible  communication. 
The  situation  is  somewhat  different  in  Example  2.  There,  type  t,  always 
wishes  to  distinguish  himself  from  t,,  whereas  t,  prefers  that  they  send  the 
same  message.  But  if R  believes  he knows  which  type  sends which  message, 
type  t2 would  rather  appear  as himself  than  as tl.  That  is,  he wants  to  pool 
with  t,  if  R  believes  that  he  is  facing  both  types,  so  that  R  will  take 
action  a3.  He  very  much  does  not  want  to  imitate  type  t,.  This  allows  t, 
the  ability  to  send  a  credible  message  as  defined  by  CMR.  Thus,  CMR 
dictates  that  types  will  always  reveal  themselves  in  certain  games,  even 
when  some  of these  types  would  much  prefer  that  no  such  revelation  takes 
place. 
Consider  Example  3. In  this  case, both  types  of S  will  do  best by  sending 
the  same  message,  if R  reacts  optimally  given  he  believes  he  is facing  both 
types.  The  statements  “I  am  either  type”  or  “I  am  not  going  to  tell  you 
what  type  I  am”  will  be  credible  as defined  by  CMR. 
EXAMPLE  2 
P(r,)=P(b)=i 
s  R 
11  ‘2  t1  12 
a1  1  -2  3  0 
a2  -2  -1  0  3 
a3  0  0  2  2 COMMUNICATION  BETWEEN  AGENTS 
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P(t,)=P(b)=i 
s  R 
1,  ‘2  ‘I  12 
al  -1  -2  3  0 
a2  -2  -1  0  3 
a3  0  0  2  2 
This  example  illustrates  that  CMR  can  be  used  to  guarantee  that 
communication  does  not  matter  in  situations  where  standard  game  theory 
allows  that  it  might.  If  there  were no  opportunity  for  S  to  speak,  then  the 
unique  equilibrium  would  obviously  be  the  “pooling”  equilibrium  in  which 
R  takes  action  a3.  When  S  can  talk,  however,  there  is a separating  sequen- 
tial  equilibrium  in  which  R,  for  all  statements,  has  very  strong  beliefs  that 
S  is  of  one  type  or  the  other.  Given  that  R  will  make  a  strong  inference 
from  any  statement,  S  will  cooperate  by  signaling  his  true  type,  because  he 
does  not  want  to  appear  as  the  other  type.  This  separating  equilibrium 
seems  unrealistic,  however.  It  would  mean,  say,  that  R  infers  that  the 
statement  “I  refuse to  tell  you  what  type  I  am”  is a sure  signal  that  S  is  of 
type  h. 
The  first  three  examples  involved  only  one  credible  message,  whereas the 
theory  permits  non-singleton  profiles  of credible  messages.  Indeed,  Exam- 
ple  4  illustrates  that  often  the  credibility  of one  message  depends  crucially 
on  the  existence  of other  credible  messages.  This  follows  from  the  definition 
of  Y*(Xj,  a),  the  set of types  who  might  want  to  imitate  Xi.  This  set can 
be  made  smaller  by  the  existence  of  other  credible  messages  which  either 
the  types  are  compelled  to  send,  or  with  which  they  would  prefer  to  pool. 
The  profile  of messages  {“I’m  t, ,  ”  “I’m  f2”}  is  credible  according  to  our 
definition.  Both  statements  will  turn  out  to  be  true  if  it  is  common 
EXAMPLE  4 
aI  0  0  9  9 
a2  10  9  10  0 
a3  9  10  0  10 158  MATTHEW  RABIN 
EXAMPLE  5 
p(t,)=  p(tJ=Af,)=  f 
a1  7  6  0  6  7  0 
a-2  6  7  0  7  6  0 
a3  0  0  6  0  0  6 
a4  -1  -1  -I  5  5  5 
knowledge  that  R  will  believe  both  of  them.  Either  message  alone  would 
not  be  credible,  because  the  other  type  might  also  make  the  statement,  if 
he  were  worried  that  R  would  react  with  a,  to  some  other  message  he 
would  send. 
Example  5  illustrates  that  CMR  is  disturbingly  weak  in  some  contexts 
where  communication  seems  natural.6  Here,  CMR  is  no  more  restrictive 
than  rationalizability.  It  would  seem  reasonable,  however,  that  types  r,  and 
t,  would  separate  themselves  from  type  t,.  While  Player  R  and  all  types  of 
Player  S  strongly  prefer  that  Player  S  reveal  whether  or  not  he  is type  t,, 
Player  S  would  also  like  to  fool  R  as to  which  of  t,  or  t2  he  is.  There  is, 
therefore,  no  credible  message  for  either  t,  or  t,,  because  neither  can  get his 
best  possible  outcome.  This  means,  in  turn,  that  type  t3  cannot  separate 
himself,  because  types  t1 and  t2  might  want  to  pool  in  with  the  message 
“I’m  f3”  to  avoid  their  worst  possible  outcome,  a4.  In  various  ways,  the 
harsh  standards  of  credibility  imposed  by  the  definitions  above  mean 
that  CMR  cannot  guarantee  a  natural  amount  of communication  in  this 
example.  Refinements  of CMR  could,  presumably,  guarantee  at  least  some 
communication  here. 
Another  sense  in  which  CMR  applies  high  standards  to  credible 
messages  is  that  it  demands  that,  for  all  t EX~,  A**(X,,  .F) = 
(argmax  US(a,  t)>  in  order  for  x,  to  send  a credible  message,  rather  than 
just  A**(X,,  X)-  {  g  =  ar  max  US(a,  t)}  or  {argmax  US(a,  t)}  cA**(X,,  X). 
That  is,  a  credible  message  must  have  the  potential  to  induce  all  payoff- 
maximizing  responses  and  0nZ.v payoff-maximizing  responses  for  all  types 
sending  the  message. 
In  this  case,  however,  the  high  standards  are,  I  believe,  warranted. 
Consider  the  credibility  of the  claim  “I’m  either  t,  or  tZ”  in  Example  6. If 
this  statement  were  believed,  it  would  induce  the  action  a,  by  R.  This 
would  yield  both  tl  and  t2 their  maximal  utility,  and  t,  his  worst  outcome, 
6 This  is  very  similar  to  suggested  examples  by  both  Joel  Sobel  and  an  anonymous  referee. COMMUNICATION  BETWEEN  AGENTS  159 
EXAMPLE  6 
AtI)  =  P(b)  =  P(f,)  =  f 
s  R 
11  12  t3  fl  '2  '3 
aa  2  2  2  2  2  2 
aI  10  10  -1  10  10  0 
a2  -1  10  10  0  10  10 
a3  0  0  0  17  0  0 
a4  0  0  0  0  0  17 
so  that  he  would  never  want  to  make  the  same  statement.  Yet  CMR  does 
not  deem  this  a  credible  statement,  because  t,  could  do  as well  if he  sent 
a  message jointly  with  t3. 
Suppose  CMR  did  not  insist  that  credible  messages  induce  all-but 
rather  just  some-of  the  responses  that  maximize  the  utility  for  the  types 
sending  the  message.  Then  “I’m  either  t,  or  tZ”  could  be  considered  a 
credible  statement.  By  the  same  logic,  the  statement  “I’m  either  t2  or  t,” 
also  would  be considered  a credible  statement.  But  then  R would  be believ- 
ing  that  tz  is  always  sending  each  of two  different  messages!  If,  rather,  he 
tried  to  conjecture  how often  t,  splits  between  the  two  messages,  he would, 
for  at  least  one  of the  messages,  respond  by  playing  either  a3 or  u4.  This 
reflects  his  calculation  that  either  most  of the  time  he  hears  “I’m  either  t1 
or  t2,”  t,  is speaking,  or  most  of the  time  he  hears  “I’m  either  t,  or  t,,”  t, 
is  speaking. 
Example  7  illustrates  the  more  straightforward  effect  of  the  condition 
that  messages  are  credible  only  if  any  rational  response  by  R  induces  a 
good  outyome  for  S. If  both  types  send the  message  “I  am  either  type”  and 
R  replies  rationally  and  charitably  with  u3,  then  both  types  do  the  best 
EXAMPLE  7 
dt,)  =  P(f2)  =  t 
s  R 
fl  f2  11  t2 
aI  -1  -2  3  0 
a2  -2  -1  0  3 
a3  0  0  2  2 
a4  -3  -3  2  2 160  MATTHEW  RABIN 
EXAMPLE 8 
aI  10  6  10  0 
a2  0  8  4  0 
a3  8  0  0  4 
they  can.  If,  however,  R  responds  rationally  and  uncharitably,  then  both 
types  do  the  worst  they  can.  CMR  does not  assume  the  charitable  response. 
Indeed,  in  this  case,  the  uncharitable  response  might  represent  a  natural, 
spiteful  response  by  R,  since  the  decision  by  S  not  to  reveal  any  informa- 
tion  has  cost  R some  utility. 
All  of the  examples  so far  have  been  such  that  Y*(  ., .) =  0.  That  is,  no 
types  outside  Tz  have  ever  desired  to  send  a credible  message.  This  means 
that  credible  claims  by  S  are  always  true.  But  the  definition  of  CMR 
considers  as  credible  some  claims  that  are  with  positive  probability 
false.  Consider  Example  8,  and  the  message  “I’m  t, .”  A *( t, ) =  a, ; 
R’s  optimal  response  to  beliefs  concentrated  on  t,  is  move  a,.  Yet  here, 
Y*(ti,  cl) =  { tz}.  That  is,  it  is  not  unreasonable  for  type  t2  to  try  to  pool 
with  t,.  Yet,  given  the  priors,  the  optimal  response  to  the  beliefs  that  he is 
facing  both  types  still  would  be  for  R  to  play  a,.  Thus,  A**(t,,  tl)  =  a,. 
Thus,  CMR  will  predict  that  type  t,  will  always  induce  a,.  Type  tz  always 
has  the  option  of  doing  so,  but  might  try  to  do  better  with  another 
message. 
CMR  thus  allows  R  to  be  uncertain  that  he  is  being  told  the  truth,  so 
long  as  he  is  confident  enough  so  that  he  will  play  as if  he  believed  the 
message.’  The  possibility  of credible  messages being  lies  with  positive  prob- 
ability  is not  readily  handled  by  relabeling.  In  Example  8,  for  instance,  we 
cannot  guarantee  the  truth  by  considering  {t,,  tz}  to  be  the  self-signaling 
set, rather  than  (tl}.  The  set  {t,,  t2}  cannot  send  a credible  message  here, 
because  t2 might  be  able  to  do  better  by  making  a  different  statement. 
While  it  may  be  reasonable  for  R  to  interpret  the  statement  “I  am  both 
types”  as  a  credible  message  for  type  t,,  the  formulation  of  CMR 
emphasizes  that  R’s  thought  process  focuses  in  on  the  certainty  of  t,‘s 
‘This  fact may be  important  for  the  robustness  of the  results:  In  all  real  situations,  there 
is  almost  certainly  some  probability  of types that,  though  not  getting  their  maximal  payoffs, 
will  want  to  send  the  same  credible  messages sent by higher  probability  types. COMMUNICATION  BETWEEN  AGENTS  161 
sending  the  message,  rather  than  on  being  certain  that  the  statement  is 
true. 
Finally,  returning  to  Example  4,  we  saw that  S  will  communicate  his 
private  information  fully.  This  is  natural;  for  both  states  of  nature,  the 
players  agree  on  which  action  is  optimal.  Communication  in  such  games 
seems  the  minimal  requirement  of  a  sensible  theory.  In  fact,  the  result 
generalizes  to  all  games  of pure  coordination,  where  in  all  states  of nature 
the  two  players  agree  on  what  would  be  the  optimal  action. 
DEFINITION  11.  A  simple  communication  game  is a  game  of pure  coor- 
dination  if,  Vt,  (argmax..,.  US(a,  t))  =  (argmax,EA*  UR(a,  t)]. 
PROPOSITION  2.  In  a game of pure  coordination,  CMR  predicts that for 
all t,  both agents will get  their  maximal utility. 
Proof.  Consider  X  =  { { ti}  1  tic  T},  the  set  of  singleton  subsets 
of  T.  Then  Y**(t,,  X)=@  Vti,  so  that,  Vti,  A**(t,,  X)=A*(t,)= 
{argmaxoEA*  US(a, ti)}.  Thus,  !Z  can send  a credible  message  profile,  yield- 
ing  both  players  their  maximal  utility  in  all  states  of nature.  The  partition 
.!Z(*)  which  sends  a credible  message  profile  in  CMR  must  then  have  this 
property.  Q.E.D. 
III.  CREDIBLE  COMMUNICATION  AND  EQUILIBRIUM  ANALYSIS 
Credible  message  rationalizability  is  a  non-equilibrium  theory:  it  does 
not  assume,  when  there  are  many  strategies  permitted  by  the  theory,  that 
players  have  perfectly  coordinated  expectations  about  how the  game  will  be 
played.  I  feel that  the  equilibrium  assumption  is less appropriate  than  usual 
in  games  where  cheap  talk  is explicitly  modeled;  one  informal  justification 
for  equilibrium  analysis  is  exactly  that  agents  will  communicate  so  as to 
form  coordinated  expectations.  To  the  extent  that  communication  is 
the  justification  for  equilibrium  analysis,  and  is  modeled  but  does  not 
achieve  full  equilibrium,  it  is  awkward  still  to  impose  further  equilibrium 
conditions8 
It  is  of interest,  however,  that  in  many  of the  examples  above,  CMR  by 
itself  already  selects  only  sequential  equilibria  as  plausible  outcomes. 
Examples  2,  3,  and  4  each  have  two  classes of sequential  equilibria;  infor- 
mative  equilibria  where  the  types  induce  different  actions  by  R, and  pool- 
ing  equilibria  where  they  induce  the  same  action.  (But  there  are  an  infinite 
s Of course, there  are  other  informal  justifications  for  equilibrium  analysis which  may come 
into  play.  For  instance,  agents  could  learn  over  time  to  coordinate  the  use  of language  in  a 
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number  of  sequential  equilibria  of  each  class,  each  one  using  a  different 
combination  of messages to  induce  the  physical  actions.)  In  each  example, 
the  set  of  rationalizable  outcomes  is  much  larger.  In  Examples  2  and  4, 
CMR  selects  the  separating  equilibria  as  the  only  plausible  play,  and  in 
Example  3, it  selects the  pooling  equilibrium.  Thus,  in  each  of these  exam- 
ples,  rationalizable  outcomes  that  are  inconsistent  with  equilibrium  are 
ruled  out  by  my  theory  of credible  communication. 
More  typical  is  Example  1,  where  some  coordination  is  implied,  but 
where,  for  a  range  of types  and  actions,  players  may  employ  the  non-equi- 
librium  behavior  permitted  by  rationalizability.  These  four  examples  thus 
add  to  the  results  of Farrell  [4]:  credible  communication  has  some  of the 
suspected  coordinating  effect, but  does  not  appear  to  be a full  justification 
for  equilibrium  analysis. 
Within  the  framework  of equilibrium  analysis,  Farrell  [S]  uses the  idea 
of  a  rich  language  by  defining  credible  neologisms  as  deviations  from 
sequential  equilibrium.  He  then  defines  a  solution  concept-Neologism- 
Proof  Equilibrium  (NPE)---as  the  set of sequential  equilibria  for  which  no 
credible  neologisms  exist.  In  this  section,  I  define  an  alternative  equilibrium 
concept  also  based  on  the  assumption  of a  rich  language,  and  compare  its 
predictions  to  NPE.  The  equilibrium  concept,  Credible  Message Equi- 
librium  (CME),  is  a  straightforward  extension  of  CMR.  It  predicts  that 
only  sequential  equilibria  formed  by  strategies  that  are  consistent  with 
CMR  will  occur. 
As  a  refinement  of  Nash  equilibrium,  CME  takes  a  different  approach 
than  is traditional.  Most  refinements  begin  with  Nash  equilibria,  and  then 
place  certain  limitations  on  behavior  by  players  off the  equilibrium  path.  If 
such  restrictions  on  behavior  will  induce  deviations  by  other  players,  then 
the  equilibrium  is eliminated. 
CME  places  ex  ante  restrictions  on  behavior.  The  range  of  permitted 
strategies  is  first  restricted  compared  to  the  strategies  permitted  by 
rationalizability.  From  this  smaller  set, any  combination  of strategies  which 
forms  a  sequential  equilibrium  is  permitted.  The  restrictions  on  plausible 
behavior  are  thus  made  without  regard  to  the  equilibrium  conditions 
themselves. 
DEFINITION  12.  A  sequential  equilibrium  is  a  Credible Message Equi- 
librium if QX,:  3X,  X,  E X,  which  can  send  a credible  message  profile,  then 
Qt E X,,  some  action  a*  E A*(X,)  is played  by  R whenever  S  is of type  t. 
Of  immediate  interest  is  whether  such  a  CME  exists  for  all  cheap-talk 
games.  It  does. 
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Proof  In  Appendix. 
The  proof  constructs  an  artificial  game  which  forces  players  to  utilize 
credible  messages  in  a particular  way consistent  with  CMR.  This  new game 
has  a sequential  equilibrium.  But  given  the  definition  of a credible  message 
profile,  I  show that  for  any  sequential  equilibrium,  the  strategy  employed 
by  each  player  is optimal  even  if the  restrictions  of the  artificial  game  were 
removed.  Therefore,  the  sequential  equilibrium  in  the  artificial  game  is also 
a  sequential  equilibrium  in  the  original  game.  Since  it  is  consistent  with 
CMR,  it  is a  CME. 
NPE  defines  a  credible  neologism  in  terms  of  a  given  sequential  equi- 
librium.  A  neologism  consists  of a claim  by  some  set of types  X  such  that, 
if R  believed  the  statement  and  chose  the  optimal  action  accordingly,  then 
exactly  those  types  in  X  would  prefer  the  outcome  to  their  equilibrium 
outcome. 
How  do  the  predictions  of  CME  compare  to  those  of NPE?  Proposi- 
tion  3  is  the  first  difference.  While  there  always  exists  a  CME,  frequently 
there  does  not  exist  an  NPE. 
Consider  Example  9.  In  this  game,  all  sequential  equilibria  involve  both 
types  of S  always  inducing  action  a3.  Yet  this  equilibrium  is  not  an  NPE, 
because  type  t,  can  send  the  credible  neologism,  “I’m  t I .”  If  believed,  only 
he  would  prefer  it  to  the  equilibrium  payoff. 
CME  does  not  deem  this  a  credible  message,  because  Y*(tl,  I~)=  (I?}. 
That  is,  R believes  that  t,  might  pool  in  with  the  message  because  it  is  not 
the  worst  that  t,  can  do.  NPE  judges  the  credibility  of  a  message  with 
respect  to  a  specific  counter-factual-a  would-be  equilibrium-whereas 
CME  judges  the  credibility  with  respect  to  the  entire  universe  of reasonable 
actions. 
The  difference  is not  unrelated  to  a frequent  criticism  of deviations-based 
equilibrium  refinements  (see, e.g.,  the  “Stiglitz  critique”  in  Cho  and  Kreps 
[2]).  Such  refinements  rely  on  some  types  of a  player  deviating  from  an 
equilibrium,  while  other  types  continue  to  believe  the  equilibrium  is  being 
EXAMPLE  9 
P(t*)=P(tJ=+ 
s  R 
1,  t2  1,  t2 
a1  2  -1  3  0 
a2  -1  -2  0  3 
a3  0  0  2  2 164  MATTHEW  RABIN 
played.  If  in  a  pooling  equilibrium,  it  were  “known”  that  t,  will  deviate, 
then  if R  does  not  see a credible  neologism,  he should  infer  that  he is facing 
t,.  Realizing  this,  t2 will  want  to  follow  fi , and  likewise  send  the  neologism. 
Since  CME  judges  the  credibility  of  statements  by  standards  that  do  not 
rely  on  specific  counter-factual  play,  its  validity  is  independent  of  this 
controversy  associated  with  deviations-based  refinements. 
Even  if we  are  willing  to  fix  an  equilibrium  payoff  and  assume  that  all 
types  are  certain  that  if they  play  their  equilibrium  action  they  will  receive 
their  equilibrium  payoff,  some  of the  statements  considered  by  NPE  to  be 
credible  neologisms  do  not  seem  particularly  compelling. 
Consider  Example  10.  There  is  a  fully  pooling  sequential  equilibrium, 
where  R  always  plays  a,.  This  is  not  an  NPE,  because  there  exists  any  of 
four  credible  neologisms  which  would  break  it.  They  would  be  self- 
signaling  messages  sent  by  any  of  the  sets  {t,,  r,).,  {t2,  t3},  {t,,  t4},  or 
1  t,,  tJ. 
Presumably  any  such credible  neologism  would  be  believed  by  R.  If  they 
all  were  believed,  then  each  type  could  choose  which  neologism  to  send. 
Their  optimal  choices  are  clear.  Type  t,  would  say  “I’m  either  t,  or  f2,” 
inducing  R  to  play  a,,  which  will  yield  t,  his  best  payoff  of  10.  Similarly, 
each  of the  other  three  types  will  send  their  preferred  messages.  Each  type 
will  send a different  message.  But  given  these choices,  R  should  not  respond 
to  the  self-signaling  sets. For  instance,  since  only  t,  will  claim  “I  am  either 
1, or  t,,”  R’s  optimal  response  will  be  to  play  a5,  not  a,.  This  would  be 
a  very  bad  outcome  for  t,. 
In  this  example,  if  S  believes  that  any  credible  neologism  would  be 
believed,  and  sends  messages accordingly,  then  it  would  be irrational  for  R 
to  believe  any  of the  neologisms.  If  R  instead  optimally  to  the  neologisms, 
EXAMPLE  10 
P(f1)=p(f,)=P(l,)=P(f,)=a 
s  R 










0  0  0  0 
10  5  -1  -1 
-1  10  5  -1 
-1  -1  10  5 
5  -1  -1  10 
-1  -1  -1  -1 
-1  -1  -1  -1 
-1  -1  -1  -1 
-1  -1  -1  -1 
3  3  3  3 
4  4  0  0 
0  4  4  0 
0  0  4  4 
4  0  0  4 
5  0  0  0 
0  5  0  0 
0  0  5  0 
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then  no  type  of S  will  wish  to  send  them.  The  problem  is that  the  different 
types  of  S  each  have  clear  preferences  among  their  multiple  credible 
neologisms.  CME  protects  against  such  a  problem:  R never  is  committed 
to  believe  that  a particular  type  will  send  each  of several  messages,  if those 
messages  yield  that  type  different  utilities. 
CME  then  permits  the  fully  pooling  equilibrium.  I  believe  that  it  is  a 
very  plausible  equilibrium.  It  is,  however,  Pareto-dominated  by  another 
equilibrium.  In  particular,  the  equilibrium  where  ( t, , tz}  induces  a,  by  R, 
and  { t,,  t4)  induces  a  3,  yields  a  higher  payoff  for  both  R  and  S  in  every 
state  of  nature.  It  is  also  Pareto-dominated  by  the  equilibrium  where 
{ t,,t,}  induces  a4 and  {t2,  t3}  induces  a*. 
The  theory  of  communication  proposed  by  CMR  and  CME  then 
suggests  that  communication  among  agents  need  not  guarantee  that  they 
will  coordinate  only  on  undominated  play.  The  problem  is  that  if  S  were 
to  propose  a  better  equilibrium  he  might  reveal  his  type  more  than 
he  would  wish,  because  the  different  types  of  S  differ  on  which  Pareto- 
dominant  equilibrium  they  wish  to  induce.g 
If  CME  is  usually  weaker  than  NPE  in  ruling  out  equilibria,  there  are 
cases where it  is more  restrictive.  Consider  Example  4 again.  This  is a game 
of pure  coordination,  and  CMR  and  CME  predict  as the  unique  outcome 
that  both  types  reveal  their  type.  NPE,  however,  does  not  eliminate  the 
pooling  equilibrium. 
The  problem  is  that  NPE  looks  for  a  single self-signaling  set  to  send  a 
credible  neologism.  But  for  either  “I’m  tl”  or  “I’m  t2,”  both  players  would 
prefer  to  state  this  to  their  pooling-equilibrium  payoff.  If  it  were common 
knowledge  that  t,  would  deviate  with  “I’m  trrr  and t,  would  deviate  with 
“I’m  t, ,”  then  both  statements  would  be credible.  CME  attains  extra  power 
by  constructing  profiles  of messages  that  are  credible  even  when  none  of 
the  component  messages  would  be  credible  by  themselves. 
V.  DISCUSSION 
Credible  Message  Rationalizability  postulates  one  particular  theory  of 
credible  communication.  As  noted,  the  theory  is  based  on  behavioral 
assumptions  that  do  not  follow  from  rationality  alone.  Thus,  other 
reasonable  theories  based  on  different  behavioral  assumptions  about  the 
use of language  might  be  plausible. 
9 Caution  is in  order,  however.  In  this  simple  setting,  I  have  not  allowed  R to  suggest a 
method  of communication  by S;  he would  likely  suggest either  of the  more  informative  equi- 
libria.  It  is  not  clear  whether  bilateral  communication  and  bilateral  asymmetric  information 
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I  conjecture  that  stronger  theories  can  be  formulated  which  are  consis- 
tent  with  how  agents  typically  use  language.  While  I  believe  such  com- 
munication  as is  predicted  by  CMR  is  quite  compelling,  a  message  must 
meet  strong  standards  in  order  to  be  deemed  credible.  In  Example  5,  for 
instance,  a stronger  theory  could  clearly  be developed  which  would  be both 
consistent  with  rationality  and  behaviorally  compelling. 
More  generally,  S  might  reasonably  doubt  his  ability  to  systematically 
fool  R.  Incorporating  this  more  cautious  thinking  by  S  into  a solution  con- 
cept  might  be possible.  For  instance,  we could  try  to  formulate  a solution 
concept  which  considers  claims  credible  that  will  yield  types  their  best 
payoff  obtainable  without  fooling  R,  rather  than  their  best  payoff  possible. 
Theories  of  credible  communication  need  not  be  Message  Profile 
Theories.  In  MPTs,  there  are  a  set of messages  which  are  always  believed 
by  R,  and  are  always  sent  by  some  types  of  S.  Perhaps  there  may  be 
reasonable  theories  where  certain  messages  are  always  believed,  but  not 
necessarily  always  sent  by  any  types  of  S.  This  could  be  consistent  with 
rationality  if  it  depended  on  R’s  reasonable  uncertainty  about  whether 
certain  types  will  or  will  not  send  such  messages. 
In  addition  to  modifying  the  theory  in  this  simple  setting,  further  work 
can  be  done  in  applying  the  ideas  to  richer  settings.  For  instance,  many 
situations  involve  bilateral  asymmetric  information  and  bilateral  com- 
munication.  New issues also  arise  when  a single  agent  tries  to  communicate 
with  many  people  at  once. 
Of  greater  interest  than  the  simple  games  analyzed  above  are  games 
where  agents  both  communicate  information  and  take  physical  actions.  In 
such  games,  private  information  can  be  of  two  forms.  Agents  can  com- 
municate  some  exogenous  private  information,  as examined  in  this  paper. 
Or  the  private  information  can  be  endogenous  to  the  game,  with  claims 
about  unobservable  past  physical  actions,  or  promises  of future  actions  (as 
in  [4]).  Interesting  issues  can  arise  because  endogenous  private  informa- 
tion  generated  by  players’  actions  will  itself  depend  on  their  theory  of what 
messages  are credible.  Finally,  some  of the equilibrium  refinement  literature 
has  implicitly  or  explicitly  used  the  idea  that  players  will  communicate 
their  intentions  in  deviating.  Explicit  modeling  of communication  into  the 
physical  game  could  contribute  to  this  literature. 
APPENDIX 
Proof  of  Proposition  1.  Choose  rs  E.Z:,(X).  Suppose  that  CJ is  strongly 
dominated  with  respect  to  Z,J.!Z)  by  some  6’ 4 Z,(T).  Using  the  notation 
from  the  definition  of an  MPT,  either  0’  was eliminated  in  some  round  of 
iterated  strong  dominance,  or  Q’ $ C,(O).  Suppose  that  0’ E C,(O),  and  was COMMUNICATION  BETWEEN  AGENTS  167 
eliminated  in  round  k  of iterated  strong  dominance.  This  means  that  o’  was 
strongly  dominated  with  respect  to  C,(k)  by  some  strategy  (T” E C,(k)  that 
is  not  eliminated  in  round  k.  If  0”  strongly  dominates  (T’ with  respect  to 
ZJk),  then  a”  strongly  dominates  CJ’ with  respect  to  C,(Z).  Thus,  there 
exists  a  strategy  in  C,(k  +  1)  that  strongly  dominates  0  with  respect 
to  Z,(!i?q. 
Thus,  for  all  k,  if  there  exists  a strategy  in  Z,(k)  that  dominates  0  with 
respect  to  Z,(X),  then  there  exists  such  a strategy  in  C,(k  +  1).  But  since 
there  is  a  last  round  of  iteration  in  which  strategies  are  eliminated,  this 
means  that  E,(.%)  contains  a  strategy  which  strongly  dominates  CJ with 
respect  to  C,(Z).  This  contradicts  the  iterated  strong  dominance  part  of 
the  definition:  r~ would  be eliminated  if it  were strongly  dominated  by  some 
0’ E C,(X). 
Thus,  0’4  C,(O).  Define  0”  as  follows:  Vt:  3X,:  t E Xi,  t  sends  with 
probability  1  some  me  M(X,).  Vrt$ T,,  t/Xi:  rq!  Y*(Xi,  X),  t  sends  any 
m  E M(X,)  with  probability  0,  and  sends any  other  messages with  probabil- 
ity  greater  than  or  equal  to  that  of (r’. By  construction,  (T” E C,(O).  Further, 
(T” weakly  dominates  (T’. To  see this,  note  that  for  all  ?E  T,,  C” induces  the 
highest  payoff  possible,  and  for  all  t $ T,,  a”  places  at  least  as  high  a 
probability  as does  g’  on  any  message  which  is  not  certain  to  induce  the 
set of worst  possible  outcomes  for  t. 
Therefore,  Va’ 4 C,(O),  3a”  E C,(O)  that  weakly  dominates  it  with  respect 
to  C,(O),  and  therefore  with  respect  to  C,(S).  Therefore,  if  0 E C,(X)  is 
strongly  dominated  by  some  strategy  not  in  C,(O),  it  is strongly  dominated 
by  some  strategy  in  C,(O)  as well.  This  contradicts  the  above  argument. 
Therefore,  no  VEX,  is  strongly  dominated  with  respect  to  C,(S)  by 
any  strategy. 
The  proof  that  no  y E C,(?Z)  is strongly  dominated  by  any  other  strategy 
y’ EZ~(O)  is  the  same,  mutatis  mutandi,  as the  above. 
For  k  30,  define  the  set  C:(k)  =  {CE  C,(k)1  If  c  maps  any  type  t  into 
m,Eh4(Xj)  with  positive  probability,  then  it  mixes  with  equal  probability 
over  all  m  E M(X,)}.  Define  C:(k)  =  (y E C,(k)  :V,X; E X,  Vml,  m2 E M(X,), 
y(m,)  =  y(mz)}.  Let  (Cg(Y),  Z:(3))  be  these  definitions  corresponding  to 
(~s(fu7  C,(V). 
Then  I  claim  V~EC,(~),  30*  EC:(~):  Vt,  a*(t)  places  equal  probability 
on  each  m  $ M(X)  as  does  (T, and  Vy EC,(k),  3y* d’:(k):  y*(m)  =  y(m) 
Vm  4 M(Z).  Suppose  not.  Then  3  some  lowest  k,  &,  for  which  this  is  not 
true.  (By  construction,  it  is true  for  (Z,(O),  C,(O)).)  But  if CJ* 4 C,(i),  then 
it  is strongly  dominated  by  some  8 E Z,(k  -  1) w.r.t.  C,(k  -  1). This  means 
that  6  strongly  dominates  G*  w.r.t.  ,Z’g(&-  l),  but  does  not  strongly 
dominate  ~7  w.r.t.  Cg(l-  1). However,  VS(a,  y) =  VS(a*,  y) Vy E C*,(k  -  l), 
which  means  that  d  clearly  cannot  strongly  dominate  cr.* without  strongly 
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some  7 E C,(L  -  1)  w.r.t.  C,(&  -  1).  But  this  means  that  f  strongly 
dominates  y*  w.r.t.  cg(f-  l),  but  does  not  strongly  dominate  y. But  again, 
VR(a,  y*)  =  VR(a,  y)  VOE C!JL  -  l),  which  means  that  f  clearly  cannot 
strongly  dominate  y*  without  also  strongly  dominating  y. 
Now  suppose  y’#  C,(O)  strongly  dominates  y ECU  w.r.t.  C,(T). 
Then  it  strongly  dominates  y w.r.t.  z:(z),  and,  by  the  claim  of the  above 
paragraph,  A’:(x)  is  non-empty.  But  then  define  y”~  C:(O)  cCR(0): 
y”(m)  =y(m)  Qm # M(5).  Then  y”  weakly  dominates  y’  w.r.t.  C:(O),  and 
thus  weakly  dominates  y’  w.r.t.  ~~(35)).  But  then  y”  strongly  dominates  y 
w.r.t.  z:(s)).  But  since  all  strategies  in  C,(X)  differ  from  strategies  in 
C:(x)  only  in  their  distributions  of m E M(T),  and  since  y”  and  y respond 
the  same  way  to  such  messages,  this  means  that  y”  strongly  dominates  y 
w.r.t.  c,(a).  But  this  contradicts  the  fact  that  no  y” E C,(O)  strongly 
dominates  y E C,(x).  Therefore,  there  does  not  exist  a  ‘J‘ $z,(O)  which 
strongly  dominates  y w.r.t.  C,(T).  Q.E.D. 
Proof  of  Lemma  1.  Let  9?( 1) =  {X,,  X,,  .  .  .  . X,}  and  X(2)  = 
p,,  z*,  **., z&v>. 
Let  F(Z,)=  (tEZj(Vk,  t$Xk). 
Let G(K)  = Lze  F(Zj),  where  Z*  =  {Z,  E x(2)  1  Zj  u  A’, #  $3 1. 
Let  (TX,,+ I) = L.J.z~~*  F(Zj),  where  Z*={Zj~X(2)IZ,~Xn+1#0, 
and  Vk<n,  ZjuXk=@}. 
The  sets F(Zj)  are  each  of the  sets from  x(2)  with  all  types  that  are  also 
in  X(1)  removed.  The  sets G(X,)  are  the  sets of types  in  z(2)  that  are  not 
in  X(  1  ), but  who  pool  with  types  who  are  in  %( 1). 
Relabel  {Zj:Zj=  F(Z,)}  as  (Zf,  Z:,  .  .  .  . ZF}.  These  are  the  set of subsets 
in  z(2)  that  do  not  overlap  with  any  Xi  E %( 1). 
By  the  construction  of  these  sets,  we  know  that  3  =  (Xi  u  G(X,), 
X,  u  G(X,),  .  .  .  . X,u  G(X,),  Z:,  Zz,  .  .  .  . Zj!)  contains  all  types  in  %( 1)  and 
z(2),  and  that  these  are  exclusive  subsets.  I  now  show  that  this  set  of 
subsets  can  send  a  credible  message  profile.  This  will  complete  the  proof 
by  construction. 
Since  %( 1)  and  s(2)  can  send  credible  message  profiles,  A*(X,)  = 
{u*  1  a*  E argmaxaEA*  US(a,  1) Vt E A’,}  and  A*(Z,)  =  (Q*  1  a*  E argmax,,,. 
US(Q,  t)  Vt eZk).  But  if  X,  and  Zk  share  an  element,  then  A*(Xj)  = 
A*(Z,).  Thus,  A*(Xj)=  (a*lQ*Eargmax,.A.  US(a,  t)  V~EX~UF(X~)). 
Clearly  Y*(Xju  G(X,),  .4?+)  E  Y*(Xj,  5?( 1));  the  set  of  types  who 
might  want  to  pool  with  X,  is  smaller  in  the  concatenated  message 
profile,  because  both  exclusionary  restrictions  in  the  definition  of 
Y*(Xj,  5?“)  are  made  more  restrictive  by  concatenation.  Further, 
since  A*(X,)=  {~*[a*  Eargmax,...  US(U,  t)  Vt~  G(X,)},  G(Xj)  E 
Y*(X,,S(l)).  Thus  Y*(X,uG(X,),  %)uG(X,)z  Y*(X,,%(l)).  By  the 
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But  since  A*(.)cA**(.,  .)  always,  and  A**(Xj,  %(l))=A*(Xj)  and 
A*(X,uG(Xj))=A*(Xj),  we  haveA**(XjuG(Xj),X)=A*(Xj~G(Xj))= 
{a*Ia*~argmax,...  US(a,  t)  Vf EXjU  G(Xj)}. 
Also,  Y*(Z:,  3’)  s  Y*(Zk,  X(2)),  so  that  A**(ZJc,  %) EA**(Z~,  z(2)). 
Since  Z,*=  Z,,  A*(ZX)  =  A*(Z,)  =  A**(Z,,  T(2)),  we have  A**(ZX,  3)  = 
A*(Z,*)=  (a*la*Eargmax,.,.  US(a,  t)  VtEZk}. 
Thus,  % can  send  a credible  message  profile  Q.E.D. 
Proof  of  Proposition  3.  Consider  the  simple  communication  game  G 
and  a  profile  of types  5? that  can  send  a  credible  message  profile  M(X). 
Then  define  a Profile  Game  G(%“, M(T))  as follows: 
Vt $ T,,  player  S  can  send  any  message  m  E M\M(X),  or  can  send  the 
.  mixed  message  m*(Xk),  for  any  X,.  TV Y*(X,,  X),  where  m*(X,)  consists 
of mixing  with  equal  probability  over  all  m E M(X,).  All  t E X,,  VX,, E X, 
must  send  m*(X,).  Player  R  can  choose  any  action  a E A *  in  response  to 
17t  E M\M(%).  He  must  respond  with  some  a E A *(X,)  to  any  m  E M(X,). 
This  is  a  well-defined  game,  with  finite  type  and  action  space,  so  there 
must  exist  some  sequential  equilibrium.  I  claim  that  (1)  the  associated 
strategies  must  be  an  equilibrium  in  the  original  game  G,  and  (2)  the 
associated  strategies  by  each  player  are  permitted  by  CMR. 
Clearly  any  sequential  equilibrium  (~9 Y)  of  G(xt^, WV)E 
(&(O),  C,(O)),  as  defined  in  the  definition  of  an  MPT  for  G,  X,  and 
M(X).  If  (c,  y) is  a sequential  equilibrium  in  G,  then  clearly  it  will  survive 
iterated  strong  dominance:  each  strategy  as  an  optimal  response  to  the 
belief  that  the  other  player  will  play  his  equilibrium  strategy.  Thus,  if  (0, y) 
is  a sequential  equilibrium,  then  (a,  y) E (Cc,  Cz). 
Choose  a sequential  equilibrium  (cr.,  y) in  G(X,  M(X)).  Vt $X,  because  (T 
is optimal  against  y in  G(%,  M(X)),  and  the  only  prevented  actions  would 
yield  these  types  their  lowest  possible  payoffs,  ci is  optimal  against  y in  G. 
Vt E X,  each  player  is getting  his  maximal  payoff  of any  action  a E A*.  Since 
all  a  played  in  y  are  contained  in  A *,  Vt E T,  0  is  optimal  against  y in  the 
original  game  G. 
By  construction  of a credible  message  profile,  for  any  strategy  by  SE  CF 
where  any  type  who  sends m  E M(X,)  mixes  with  equal  probability  over  all 
mEhI(  it  must  be  optimal  for  R  to  respond  by  playing  ueA*(X,). 
Therefore,  since  R  can  choose  any  a E A*  in  response  to  m  4 M(S),  as in 
the  original  game  G, y is an optimal  response  to  CJ  in  G.  Q.E.D. 
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